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executive summary |
Young offenders face a wide range of individual, family, and environmental
obstacles. Determining the best response to any one youth requires a
customized program of prevention, rehabilitation, and public safety resources.
The City of Chicago’s Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (JISC) uses
a collaborative approach to providing services and supports for youth from
several South Side neighborhoods.1 Young people are taken to the JISC by
police for screening and assessment and to be either: (1) diverted and sent
home, (2) “station adjusted” and referred to case management services, or (3)
moved on for juvenile justice processing.
To the extent that the JISC represents a new approach for dealing with young
offenders in Chicago, the non-diverted, station-adjusted youth referred
to case management are its primary clients. Such youth have often been
arrested for delinquent offenses, or they have been referred to the JISC as a
result of technical violations (e.g., failure to appear in court). Police officials
offer the youth station adjustments and case management because their
current offenses and prior records do not merit prosecution, but they do
appear to need some type of intervention. As long as they cooperate with
case managers and complete a program of voluntary services and activities,
they can avoid further involvement with the justice system.
The Chicago JISC is similar to programs in other jurisdictions, often called
“juvenile assessment centers.” Before implementing the JISC, Chicago officials
researched the concept of juvenile assessment centers and visited programs
around the country, including the original centers in Florida. The City officials
hoped to design a process that would ensure an effective response for young
offenders, while keeping as many youth as appropriate from becoming
ensnared in the justice system. Several strategies for community intervention
and youth services were central in the development of the JISC. The most
essential frameworks included: (1) early intervention, (2) interagency service
coordination, (3) graduated sanctioning, (4) community justice and problemsolving justice, (5) restorative justice, and (6) positive youth development.
One year after the JISC opened its doors, and with funding from the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the City of Chicago asked researchers
to review the operations of the JISC and to conduct a process evaluation of
its policies and practices. One of the main goals of the study was to assess
the readiness of the JISC for a more detailed outcome or impact evaluation.
During 2007 and 2008, researchers visited the JISC numerous times,
reviewed an assortment of documents and reports about the program, and
interviewed a wide range of individuals involved in its design, operation, and
management.
The study focused on issues identified by previous research on juvenile
assessment centers, including program funding, design and target
population, agency partnerships, governance and staffing, and data systems
and policies governing the sharing of client information. In addition, the
researchers explored whatever topics were suggested by their interviews with
local officials.
1
This report uses the present tense to describe the operations of the Chicago JISC, but readers are
advised that the research was conducted between 2007 and 2009 and some aspects of the
program have likely changed.
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Based on their review, the study team came to the following conclusions:

>

By the third year of operation, the JISC was seen as a successful program. Many
administrative challenges had been met through the leadership of City officials.
The long-term success of the program, however, depended on its ability to deliver
meaningful services and supports for youth and families.

>

Unlike juvenile assessment centers in other cities, which have sometimes lapsed
into simple referral mechanisms for providers in the mental health and drug
treatment sectors, the Chicago JISC was built around the concepts of restorative
justice and positive youth development. This innovative approach was one of the
best features of the JISC but also one of its biggest challenges.

>

To fulfill its core mission, the JISC required a broad menu of services, supports, and
opportunities for youth and families. Many of these resources cannot be purchased
from professional service providers. They come into existence only through the
recruitment and organization of individual volunteers, neighborhood groups, and
allied partners, including small-business owners and the faith community. The City
needed to invest in these efforts if the JISC was to succeed over the long term.

>

The success of the JISC also depended on the City’s continued management of
the inevitable incompatibilities between police and social services. Their different
views regarding the issues facing at-risk youth and the most effective solutions for
those issues had to be handled on an ongoing basis.

>

Even three years into operation, serious disputes remained over the mission of
the JISC and the potential it had to “widen the net” of intervention by bringing
non-serious offenders into the justice system, but the partner agencies aired these
disputes successfully, and it was unlikely that such problems would go unnoticed
in the future.

>

The administrative structure and information management capacity of the JISC
appeared to be sufficient for the program to participate in a future outcome
evaluation.

>

The primary challenge facing the JISC was the lack of depth and diversity in the
resources it was able to offer to youth and families.
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introduction |
Juveniles arrested for criminal violations are not a single, homogenous
group. They face a wide range of individual, family, and environmental
obstacles, and they would benefit from varying sanctions, services, and
supports. Determining the best response to an individual youth cannot be
the sole responsibility of public safety officials. Law enforcement agencies are
concerned with public safety and the severity of criminal behavior, but most
youth arrested by police have not committed, and may never commit, serious
or violent crimes. Among juvenile arrests in Chicago in 2005, for example, the
top five offenses were drug-abuse violations, simple battery, various nonIndex offenses (e.g., criminal trespass), disorderly conduct, and larceny-theft
(Herdegen 2006). A youth’s involvement in such behavior might be a relatively
harmless mistake made by a still-developing adolescent, or it could be the
first sign of trouble by a future career criminal. How are the police and the
courts to distinguish among these possibilities?
The Chicago Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (JISC) is an attempt
to bring greater consistency to such decisions. The JISC provides preventive
services and supports to young people from Chicago’s South Side
neighborhoods. Youth selected by the JISC for case management services
have been arrested for delinquent offenses or technical violations, such as
failure to appear in court. They are usually young first-time or second-time
offenders, and as long as they voluntarily complete a program of services and
activities, they can avoid further involvement with the justice system and the
stigma of adjudication.
After a lengthy process of planning and program development, the JISC
opened its doors to clients in March 2006. One year later, the City of Chicago,
with funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
invited researchers to conduct a process evaluation of the program. The goal
of a process evaluation is to document the conceptualization, design, and
operations of a program. Process evaluations help social programs prepare
for outcome evaluations that measure their effectiveness and success with
clients. During 2007 and 2008, researchers visited the JISC numerous times,
reviewed documents and reports about the program, and interviewed a wide
range of individuals. Interviews were conducted with the leaders and staff
of public agencies, including the Office of the Mayor of the City of Chicago,
the Chicago Police Department, the Chicago Department of Children and
Youth Services, the Chicago Public Schools, the Cook County Circuit Court,
the State’s Attorney’s Office for Cook County, the Office of the Cook County
Public Defender, the Cook County Juvenile Probation Department, and the
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Interviews were also conducted
with private, nongovernmental organizations, including the Sinai Community
Institute and the Community Justice for Youth Institute.
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| program setting
Chicago’s Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (JISC) is a pre-court
diversion program that provides preventive services and supports for “station
adjusted” (informally handled) youthful offenders. Police officials offer station
adjustments to youth whose current offense and prior record do not seem to
merit prosecution and referral to juvenile court. By successfully completing
the voluntary services provided through the JISC and by keeping out of
trouble with the police, a young person has an opportunity to avoid the stain
of adjudication and a chance to grow up without the burden of a court record.
The Chicago JISC serves youth from the regions of the city designated
by the Chicago Police Department as districts 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 21. These
communities on Chicago’s South Side contain numerous thriving and diverse
neighborhoods, but they also include some of the most distressed areas
of the city, including North Lawndale, Englewood, Pilsen, and Little Village.
According to the Chicago Police Department, the total population in the
communities served by the JISC was nearly 800,000 as of 2006. Residents of
these areas reported more than 40,000 crimes that were serious enough to
be counted in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Crime Index, including
145 homicides, 507 criminal sexual assaults, and 4,702 robberies. Of course,
the vast majority of these crimes were committed by adults, but the scope of
offending suggests that juveniles in these neighborhoods are likely to face
severe obstacles and risks.
Launched by the City of Chicago in 2006, the Juvenile Intervention and
Support Center is an attempt to create a new approach to justice for the
city’s young people. The JISC is a multiagency collaboration involving law
enforcement agencies, juvenile probation officials, prosecutors, children and
youth services, public schools, health care providers, neighborhoods, and
families.
Youth and families have their first contacts with the JISC at a facility on
Chicago’s South Side, but the JISC is not a building. It is a process. The goal
of the process is to identify delinquent youth as soon as possible after they
begin to violate the law and to implement services and supports that lower
the chances of future crime.

> juvenile intervention
and support center
3900 South California Street
Chicago, Illinois
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The JISC responds to the delinquent acts of Chicago teens to prevent their
further involvement with the juvenile justice system. It does this by assessing
the circumstances of each youth and family and, where appropriate, involving
them in a case management process that identifies services they may need
(e.g., family counseling, drug and alcohol treatment, and anger management).
Beyond services and treatment, however, the JISC process tries to connect
youth with positive supports and activities that might prevent them from
committing additional crimes. Case managers work to engage each youth and
family in an array of resources that provide positive experiences, including
physical activity and sports, educational assistance, training and employment
connections, participation in civic or community affairs, and experience with
forms of personal expression such as music and the arts.
According to officials from one of the key partners in the JISC, the Chicago
Department of Children and Youth Services (CYS), the JISC process was
designed to create more effective interventions in the following ways:

>

Identifying and leveraging the strengths and capabilities of youth and families

>

Encouraging youth and families to assume responsibility for their futures and to
take control of their lives

< juvenile arrests:
chicago police districts
Source:
Juvenile Arrest Trends—2000-2005.
Chicago Police Department, Research and
Development Division, June 2006.
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>

Actively involving families and community members in all aspects of service
planning and delivery; ensuring that families have access, voice, and ownership

>

Working with youth at the times of day when most delinquent acts occur (i.e., after
school and early evening)

>

Revising strategies rather than blaming clients

>

Linking youth with opportunities and supports in addition to services

>

Linking families with services, supports, and opportunities that are appropriate for
their specific needs

>

Developing new resources when existing resources are inadequate

>

Developing individualized discharge plans after consulting with youth and family
members

>

Ensuring that supports are in place to sustain the family after discharge

>

Monitoring the effectiveness of JISC efforts and enhancing statistical information
with input from families

Prior to the opening of the JISC, approximately 8,000 juveniles were arrested
each year in the neighborhoods served by the program. Some offenses were
serious enough to warrant immediate referral to the Cook County juvenile
court system. Others were best handled within the family without any further
contact with law enforcement or social services. Many arrests, however, fell
between the two extremes. They were serious enough to merit intervention,
but not serious enough to warrant formal justice involvement. The inbetween cases were the main reason the City of Chicago launched the JISC.
City officials estimated that 2,000 of the youth arrested each year in the areas
served by the JISC would be appropriate for the preventive services offered by
the JISC, if there were sufficient resources available to meet their needs.
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study approach |
A process evaluation is not an outcome evaluation. An outcome evaluation
is used to test whether a program produces the client outcomes it says it
does. A process evaluation documents how a program conducts its dayto-day business. It assesses the conceptualization, design, delivery, and
measurement of client interventions before those interventions are subjected
to a more rigorous outcome evaluation. To employ the medical metaphor
of treatment dosage and patient response, it could be said that a process
evaluation investigates whether a treatment is being delivered as intended,
while an outcome evaluation tests whether patients get better after receiving
treatment.
To prepare for an outcome evaluation, the JISC must be able to measure
the intensity of services for each youth and family and to assess the fidelity
of each service plan. In other words, do the services and supports offered
through the JISC make sense, given the program’s expressed “theory
of change” (i.e., that young offenders respond best to early, informal
interventions that are consistent with restorative justice and positive youth
development)?
To participate in an outcome evaluation, the JISC would need to be capable of
generating detailed, individual-level data about screening, case management,
and referral as well as subsequent service contacts, the duration of services,
and the diversity of services for each youth, including the extent to which
each youth and family participates in the various opportunities and supports
managed directly by the JISC, its contractors, or other community-based
groups. For an outcome evaluation, the program would need to produce
long-term youth outcome measures (e.g., the prevalence of new arrests or
new court contacts in the 12, 18, or 24 months following JISC intervention).
A process evaluation is helpful in establishing whether these necessary
data elements can be collected reliably and consistently, and whether the
same data elements could be available for a suitable comparison group. In
a process evaluation, researchers ask critical questions about a program’s
activities and the availability of important data. Before a process evaluation
is completed, this information is rarely available. Even senior program
officials are usually not able to answer key questions in enough detail to
allow a researcher to ascertain whether a program is ready to engage in an
outcome evaluation. Without an effective process evaluation, an outcome
evaluation would be unlikely to generate findings that would be considered
conclusive. Even the most sophisticated statistical techniques cannot make
up for an evaluation design that fails to measure service intensity accurately.
Unless service intensity can be monitored, a program is simply a “black box”
of undifferentiated causes that may or may not be related to a program’s
expected effects, even if those effects (e.g., behavior change) may appear
impressive out of context.

Process Evaluations versus Management Studies

The tasks and activities required for a process evaluation are similar to those
used in management studies. Both investigations involve the collection of
program documents, interviews with program staff, and an examination of
data systems.
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Their purposes, however, are quite different. The goal of a management study
is to answer questions about the efficiency of an organization’s business
practices. These questions might include the following:

>

Does the agency have effective leadership?

>

Does the agency have appropriately trained staff?

>

Does the agency demonstrate effective communication, internally and externally?

>

Are the partners and subcontractors involved with the agency appropriate, and do
they have the skills and capacities necessary to perform?

>

Does the agency have sound contracts or memoranda of agreement to establish
an appropriate division of labor with its key partners?

>

Does the agency have mechanisms in place to track expenditures?

>

Is the information system adequate to maintain core operations?

These questions are about the effectiveness of agency operations and the
organization’s administrative acumen. They do not address the impact
of agency efforts on clients, nor do they generate information about the
appropriateness of the program’s basic approach. An agency could be
expertly administered but ineffective due to shortcomings in its theory of
change. A program based on a bad or misplaced theory of change might be
operated efficiently but fail to have a measurable impact on outcomes.
To use an extreme (and even silly) example, an agency could assert that the
best method of reducing youth recidivism is to teach all young offenders how
to play poker. The program might be run quite efficiently. It might provide
all youth with playing cards, chips, and betting instructions, and it might
do so in a very cost-effective manner, using trained staff and well-managed
contractors. Someone, however, eventually has to ask the question, “Does
poker playing really reduce recidivism?” The task of an evaluator is to answer
that question with statistical precision.
A management study may address the client-related processes of an agency,
but it does so in a descriptive way. Investigators in management studies
usually accept the reports of agency officials at face value. When a program
manager describes the range of services provided to clients, it is often beyond
the scope of a management study to test the accuracy of the description. A
process evaluation, on the other hand, is explicitly designed to investigate the
accuracy of normative program descriptions, because the central goal of the
process evaluation is to measure program activities as they really are, rather
than as agency leaders would like to characterize them.

Methods Used in the Study

In 2007 and 2008, researchers met with the Chicago Police Department,
Children and Youth Services, and JISC staff to discuss the general plan of the
process evaluation. They toured the facility several times and were introduced
to the components of case processing—intake, screening, and case
management. Interviews were conducted with various individuals identified
by the research team or through referrals made during interviews. Each of the
following people was interviewed at least once during the study.
| 11

(Note: The affiliations listed were accurate at the time of the study interviews.)

> John Adams, Sinai Community Institute
> Megan Alderden, Chicago Police Department
> Kathleen Bankhead, Juvenile Justice Division, Cook County State’s Attorney
> Mary Ellen Caron, Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services
> Ginny Caufield, Balanced and Restorative Justice, Cook County Juvenile Court
> Cathy Kolb, Chicago Police Department
> Evelyn R. Cole, Sinai Community Institute
> Earl Dunlap, Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center
> Cheryl Graves, Community Justice for Youth Institute
> Robert Hargesheimer, Chicago Police Department
> Errol Hicks, Chicago Police Department
> Lori Levin, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority
> Christopher Mallette, Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services
> Mike Masters, Office of the Mayor
> Mark Myrent, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority
> Jim McCarter, Juvenile Justice Division, Cook County State’s Attorney
> Peter Newman, County Circuit Court
> Azim Ramelize, Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services
> Judith Rocha, Sinai Community Institute
> Mike Rohan, Juvenile Probation and Court Services, Cook County Juvenile Court
> Angela Rudolph, Office of the Mayor
> Larry Sachs, Chicago Police Department
> Steven Terrell, Chicago Police Department
> Dianne Thompson, Chicago Police Department
> Cynthia Williams, Sinai Community Institute
> Paula Wolff, Chicago Metropolis 2020
12 |

The researchers also reviewed a wide range of documents from the JISC and
from the various agencies involved in its development. These documents
included reports, meeting notes, interagency memoranda, intake and
screening forms, outreach material describing the program and outlining
its mission, newsletters, pamphlets on services offered, flow charts, arrest
report forms, station adjustment forms (formal and informal), victim-offender
conferencing paperwork, counseling referral forms, peer jury paperwork, Sinai
Community Institute spreadsheets, and a guide on balanced and restorative
justice. Finally, researchers reviewed various management information
systems used by the Chicago Police Department, the Sinai Community
Institute, the Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services, and the
JISC itself to understand what information was collected on youth and what
role such information played (and was intended to play) in the operation of
the center and the processing of individual cases.
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the jisc process |
When a young person arrives at the JISC building on South California Street
in Chicago, he or she has probably just been apprehended and/or arrested
by Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers and taken to the JISC by car.
Escorted by patrol officers, the youth enters the JISC building through a side
door adjacent to the parking lot. While one of the arresting officers fills out an
arrest report and other required paperwork, the youth is most likely secured
with handcuffs to a booking bench, a wooden bench that is bolted to the
floor and the wall. After 30 to 60 minutes, the patrol officer leaves the JISC,
and the youth is escorted to the second floor of the building to be fingerprinted and photographed. The youth then waits in a secure area of the JISC,
which is a small waiting room with ceiling-mounted fluorescent lights, hard
plastic furniture, and a large plexiglass window that allows CPD officers to observe the waiting youth. The room has nothing else in it. There are no reading
materials and no television. Youth are required to remain seated unless given
permission to stand or move.
They youth may wait in the secure area for an hour or even several hours,
depending on the time of day and the backlog of cases in need of further
processing. At some point, a detective comes to take the youth to an office to
begin the intake process. The intake detective asks a series of questions while
filling out an assessment form that organizes the facts pertinent to the intake
decision. During the interview, the detective notes the situation surrounding
the youth’s arrest, the severity of the offense, the youth’s criminal background,
and whether any warrants exist from previous arrests.
The assessment form provides an easy way to list the information gathered
from name checks, arrest reports, and the computer check. Felonies and
misdemeanors are listed separately to assess each youth’s criminal history. The
officer then assigns a risk level by checking or not checking a series of boxes
that characterize the youth’s arrest history. Using the assessment form, the officer has the discretion to determine if the youth poses a low, medium, or high
risk. The tally of the assessment form is not absolute, but if an officer decides
to handle the case in a way that is not consistent with the results of the assessment form, the decision must be reported and explained to a supervisor.
In cases involving serious offenses or multiple prior offenses, youth may be
transferred to secure detention. If detention is not considered appropriate,
but the youth has been charged with relatively serious offenses or has an
extensive arrest record, the case will likely be referred to juvenile court for
further legal processing. The remaining youth, the non-detained and nonreferred cases, are eligible for station adjustment and case management
services.
A station-adjusted youth who is referred to case management has to wait
once again in the secure area on the second floor of the JISC building until
a parent or guardian arrives and consents to meet with staff from the Sinai
Community Institute (SCI). The officers try to accommodate the youth if he or
she needs to use the restroom or becomes hungry; however, no activities are
provided. One CPD officer, when asked about the stark environment of the
waiting area, endorsed its punitive qualities, stating that “We have to let them
know that when they’re arrested, there are certain rights they lose. Remember
how this feels so that next time you won’t do what you did to come in here.”
14 |

If a youth and family
cooperate with SCI and
successfully complete
the goals of the service
plan, their case will be
closed.

After the parent or guardian arrives, a CPD officer brings the youth to the
first floor of the building and speaks with the family in an office off the lobby.
The officer describes the arrest and then explains that the juvenile is being
adjusted and referred to case management rather than facing formal charges
and a court hearing. A worker from the case management agency, SCI, meets
with the youth and parent, explains case management, and invites the parent
to consent to the program. If the parent refuses, the CPD detective returns
and explains that the matter will be referred to the State’s Attorney’s Office.
If the parent or guardian consents to the station adjustment and agrees to
participate in case management, the SCI worker begins to interview the youth
and parent and conducts additional assessments in order to prepare an individualized family service plan. At that point, the CPD officers are finished with
the case. Officers keep track of how long youth are at the JISC (when they enter the building, when they go upstairs, when they enter and leave the secure
area, and when they leave the JISC with a parent). Ideally, the entire process is
completed within six hours.
If a youth and family cooperate with SCI and successfully complete the goals
of the service plan, their case will be closed. Some families, however, agree to
cooperate but then walk out of the JISC building and disappear. Clearly, some
people who pick up youth from the JISC never intend to complete the service
plan; they just want to get out of the JISC building as quickly as possible.
After three follow-up calls and two unannounced home visits, the case
management staff at SCI sends a certified letter to the family saying that their
continued lack of cooperation has resulted in the matter being returned to
the police and the State’s Attorney’s Office. The SCI staff member fills out a
form explaining why the case should be closed. An SCI social worker reviews
the form and passes it on to the director for review, at which point the case
is closed. When a family fails to follow through with SCI, the police department notifies the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, and a prosecutor may
decide to reinstate the original charges against the youth, in keeping with the
deferred prosecution procedures agreed upon by the State’s Attorney’s Office
and City officials.

| 15

conceptual precursors |
Before implementing the JISC, a number of Chicago officials researched
the concept of juvenile assessment centers and visited other programs
around the country. The City hoped to design a process that would ensure
an effective response for young offenders while maintaining vigorous
diversion standards. Several strategies for community intervention and youth
services were central in the development of the Chicago JISC. The most
essential frameworks include (1) early intervention, (2) interagency service
coordination, (3) graduated sanctioning, (4) community justice and problemsolving justice, (5) restorative justice, and (6) positive youth development.

Early Intervention

The JISC was designed to achieve a basic but often neglected goal of juvenile
justice—to respond immediately and effectively to a youth’s first delinquent
acts in order to prevent future crime and avoid the costs of repeated
delinquency. Members of the public often believe that early intervention is a
principal function of the juvenile justice system, but it is actually rare for large
cities to pursue early intervention seriously. The first, second, or even third
delinquent act by a young person is often ignored by juvenile authorities.
One reason for this apparent lack of action is that a vast majority of youth
engage in at least some illegal behavior before adulthood. In fact, one in
three juveniles commits at least one serious act of property crime or violence
before age 18 (Thornberry and Krohn 2003:100–101). Responding formally
to all instances of delinquent behavior would be extremely expensive.
Thus, the justice system refrains from taking action until a youth exhibits
persistent delinquency. Another reason why justice officials often fail to act
in response to a first criminal violation is that bringing youth into the juvenile
justice system is risky. The stigma and negative self-identity associated with
legal sanctions may cause youth to engage in more illegal behavior, not
less (Bernburg and Krohn 2003). Because of this risk, as well as the need to
maintain sound public policy regarding diversion from the justice system, it is
important to avoid drawing youth into the legal system unnecessarily.
Due to these legitimate concerns, most communities wait to intervene
aggressively with delinquent youth until they have been arrested several
times. At most, first-time offenders may be offered informal, noncoercive
referrals to social service agencies. This is rarely effective, however, because of
a third reason why communities fail to intervene at the onset of delinquency:
Most communities simply have very little to offer youth and families in
need of preventive services and supports, especially the type of resources
that would be accepted and used by voluntary clients. Lacking an array
of appealing resources, communities usually fail to intervene during the
formation of delinquent behavior. Yet, this is probably when intervention
is most effective. The best time to intervene in any antisocial or destructive
behavior is early, as soon as it appears. Arguing for early intervention is easy;
implementing it is hard.

Interagency Coordination

In the past decade, jurisdictions across the United States have tried to increase
cross-agency coordination. The chronic absence of effective coordination
among service agencies has long been one of the most potent barriers to
preventing and reducing juvenile crime (Howell 1995; Rivers, Dembo, and
16 |

The JISC was designed
to achieve a basic but
often neglected goal
of juvenile justice —to
respond immediately
and effectively to a
youth’s first delinquent
acts in order to prevent
future crime and avoid
the costs of repeated
delinquency.

Problem solving has
long been the mission
of the juvenile justice
system and one of
the key reasons for
the development of
juvenile assessment
centers.

Anwyl 1998; Lipsey and Wilson 1998; Lipsey 1999; Cocozza and Skowyra
2000; Slayton 2000; Jenson and Potter 2003). Traditionally, human services
agencies were established to provide specific programs (e.g., substance use/
abuse intervention, sex offender treatment, education support, mental health
treatment), and each agency worked individually with its own particular client
population. The resulting interventions were often inefficient and ineffective,
and jurisdictions found it difficult to identify and work with youth who
presented co-occurring disorders involving mental health problems, family
problems, substance abuse, educational deficits, and other social problems
(Peters and Bartoi 1997; Peters and Hills 1997). In response, many states made
intra- and interagency collaboration a priority (National Criminal Justice
Association 1997; Rivers and Anwyl 2000).

Graduated Sanctions

The operative philosophy of the JISC is also consistent with the graduated
sanctions approach (Howell 1995). Grounded in both research and
common sense, graduated sanctioning ensures that there is at least some
response to each instance of illegal behavior as juveniles begin to violate
the law. Jurisdictions that embrace this approach develop a full continuum
of sanctions, including immediate sanctions for first-time offenders,
intermediate and community-based sanctions for more serious offenders,
and secure/residential placement for those youth who commit especially
serious or violent offenses. Such approaches can introduce a greater degree of
consistency in how youth within and across jurisdictions are sanctioned. More
important, they can promote justice solutions that rely on the demonstrated
effectiveness of rehabilitation and treatment, and that emphasize
responsiveness, accountability, and responsibility as the cornerstones of an
effective juvenile justice system.

Community Justice and Problem-Solving Justice

Many components of the juvenile justice system have begun to adopt the
framework of “community justice” and “problem-solving justice.” Community
justice refocuses the nature of justice-system intervention. Each incidence
of criminal behavior is viewed within the context of the community in
which it occurs. Professionals within the justice system work to develop
relationships with community leaders and other residents to understand
why crime happens and to prevent future occurrences. These concepts have
inspired several important program innovations in the criminal justice system,
including community policing, community prosecution, and community
courts (Rottman and Casey 1999; Connor 2000; Karp and Clear 2000).
Problem-solving justice is an old idea in the juvenile justice system, but in
recent years it has become a compelling framework in criminal justice as
well. Rather than simply identifying offenders, weighing the evidence against
them, and imposing punishment, the problem-solving perspective calls upon
the justice system to use the processes of investigation, arrest, prosecution,
and sentencing to solve problems in the community. This shifts the focus of
the justice system to the well-being of families and communities instead of
the culpability of offenders.
Problem solving has long been the mission of the juvenile justice system and
one of the key reasons for the development of juvenile assessment centers.
One influential statement in support of community justice and problemsolving justice was made more than a decade ago by two administrators for
the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
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In their Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile
Offenders, Wilson and Howell (1993) suggested that the juvenile justice
system would be more efficient and effective if it emphasized communitybased approaches. Their ideas were echoed by the members of the federal
Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1996).

Restorative Justice

Another important shift in juvenile justice practice is the growing emphasis
on restorative justice, an alternative framework for legal intervention,
replacing or at least counter-balancing retributive justice. Retributive justice
ensures that each offender suffers a punishment in proportion to the harm
inflicted on the victim of the offense. Restorative justice provides a means for
each offender to correct that harm, or at least to compensate the victim, even
if the victim is the general community.
Several well-known program models are associated with the restorative
justice movement, but the most popular are victim-offender mediation and
family group conferencing. The number of these programs has increased
sharply during the last 10 years, and research suggests that they may offer an
effective alternative to traditional court processing (Bazemore and Umbreit
1995; McGarrell, Olivares, Crawford, and Kroovand 2000). Restorative justice
principles are also endorsed explicitly in Illinois State law. The “Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of 1998” changed the purpose of juvenile justice in Illinois law to
the pursuit of a proper balance between offender accountability and victim
or community restoration.

Positive Youth Development

Finally, the design of the JISC was shaped by an even more innovative
approach—positive youth development (PYD). Positive youth development
suggests that the goal of youth programs should be social attachment rather
than behavioral control. Instead of focusing on problem avoidance and risk
reduction, communities should help young people to establish a sense of
identity, usefulness, and belonging. It is a simple notion. All adolescents
need the experiences that youth in wealthy communities take for granted,
including caring relationships with pro-social adults, the opportunity to play
organized sports, self-expression through music and the arts, after-school
employment, and civic engagement through group membership.
The PYD framework emerged from several decades of efforts to create
an alternative to the once-prevailing view of adolescence as a thicket of
problems and deficits (National Research Council 2002). Positive youth
development is a comprehensive way of supporting the factors that facilitate
a youth’s growth and successful transition to adulthood. Its concepts of are
an attempt to answer critical questions, such as “What forces help youth to
achieve productive and healthy adulthoods?” and “How can families and
communities bring those forces to bear in the lives of individual youth?” The
central purpose of PYD is action. While the term “adolescent development”
describes the topic of scientific investigation in which researchers generate
knowledge about the processes of individual growth and maturation,
the term “positive youth development” represents the various methods,
techniques, and practices used to apply scientific knowledge about
adolescent development in agency and community settings (Pittman, Irby,
and Ferber 2000).
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Despite broad public support for these concepts, positive youth development
is not often used to design interventions for young offenders. The JISC is
an attempt to do so. Implementing a PYD approach for young offenders
requires a broad range of interventions and strategies. Directing services
and supports toward the type of youth outcomes suggested by PYD means
connecting youth with positive adult relationships, possibly through
mentoring programs. It means expanding contacts between juvenile
offenders and positive peer role models, perhaps with peer jury programs.
It also means providing youth with educational supports; work experience;
civic engagement; and safe, productive opportunities for physical activity and
personal expression through music and the arts (Butts, Bazemore, and Meroe
2010).
Almost by definition, the resources necessary to support a PYD approach
have to be local and small scale. Large bureaucracies cannot implement PYD
strategies independently; they have to harness the power of volunteers, local
businesses, neighborhood groups, and community organizations. Developing
and sustaining these resources is difficult and time consuming. If local
governments try the shortcut of buying solutions from professional service
providers, they usually end up with more bureaucracy and standardized
services rather than with genuine community-based resources and
opportunities for youth.
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similar programs in other
jurisdictions |
The Chicago JISC is similar to other efforts to centralize delinquency prevention and diversion services. Jurisdictions across the country have started a
variety of similar programs in an attempt to provide earlier screening and
assessment of youth, to identify young offenders with special needs, and to
provide more timely interventions (Cocozza and Skowyra 2000; Rivers and
Anwyl 2000). Often called “juvenile assessment centers” (JACs) or “community
assessment centers” (CACs), the programs are designed to provide systematic
and consistent assessment of youth referred to the juvenile justice system
and to accelerate the delivery of preventive services. Their underlying goal is
to provide an empirical basis for decision making regarding young offenders
(Rivers and Anwyl 2000).
Advocates for JAC and CAC programs see them as a means of identifying
and eliminating gaps in services, facilitating integrated case management,
improving communication among agencies, increasing the community’s
awareness of youth needs, and providing more appropriate interventions and
better outcomes for youth (Oldenettel and Wordes 2000). There have been
very few evaluations of JACs, but the literature generally suggests that the
programs may reduce the time and resources necessary for law enforcement
to process the youngest and least serious juvenile offenders. Studies also indicate that the presence of a JAC can lead to increased information sharing and
collaboration among justice and social services agencies, increased numbers
of youth referred for preventive services, and a broader use of diversion for
youth. As always, however, the positive features of JAC programs have to be
weighed against their potential negative characteristics, including the possibility that the programs aggravate net widening, as law enforcement agencies react to expanded interventions by expanding the type of youth they are
willing to arrest (Cronin 1996; Cocozza, et al. 2005; Castrianno 2007).
The first known JAC opened in Florida in 1993, partially in response to a rash
of highly publicized juvenile crimes that were damaging the tourist industry
(Cronin 1996). In 1995, relying heavily on the Florida JAC experience, the
administrator of the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) issued a brief report that examined the JAC concept (Bilchik
1995). The report described the results of focus groups that were held to
discuss the JAC concept and its implementation in Florida. It also considered
whether the JAC model could reduce the systemic barriers encountered by
juvenile justice agencies as they worked to implement the OJJDP’s Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders (Wilson
and Howell 1993).
The report recommended that future JAC programs incorporate several key
program elements, including a single point of entry for youth referrals, immediate and comprehensive assessments for youth, the use of management
information systems capable of monitoring each youth’s progress through
multiple treatment programs and across multiple systems, and a well-integrated case management process. Five concerns about the JAC model were
discussed as well, including the dangers of labeling young offenders, the
potential for breaches of client confidentiality, the risk that expanding the
JAC model could widen the net of justice system responsibility, the difficulties
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of achieving true interagency coordination, and the possible risks to youth
rights and due process (Bilchik 1995). However, the 1995 report recognized
that the JAC concept was a promising strategy, and the Justice Department
announced that it would begin a demonstration project in 1996. Assessment
centers began to spread across the United States soon thereafter.
Despite the growing popularity of community assessment centers, there
has still been very little rigorous analysis of their effectiveness. Most available information about JAC-style programs is descriptive, including program
descriptions and practitioner recommendations. A search of the literature
suggests that 20 programs have been investigated by independent researchers in recent years. Nearly all the previous studies, however, were process
evaluations. Only one outcome evaluation has been published. The National
Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) studied four programs involved
in an OJJDP demonstration initiative between 1997 and 1999 (Wordes and
Le 2000). The study employed a quasi-experimental design and could not
generate true evidence of program impact. Nevertheless, the findings were
generally supportive of the JAC model.
The NCCD study involved two operating assessment centers and two in the
planning stages. The analysis included an examination of program records,
staff interviews and surveys, reviews of assessment services, and a measurement of recidivism using automated records. Researchers addressed the
environmental context of the JAC programs and described their procedures
for establishing client eligibility; their case-processing methods; the range of
intervention programs they offered; their organizational linkages and relationships; and youth outcomes, including recidivism.
Regarding the latter, the study compared the prevalence of recidivism among
youth involved in the JAC programs with youth from a matched comparison
group. Experimental youth (JAC) and comparison youth (non-JAC) reoffended
at about the same rate, although the JAC youth had more rearrests for property and status offenses, while comparison youth had more rearrests for violent offenses. Involvement in a JAC program also appeared to be associated
with a slower rate of subsequent recidivism. Among the youth who eventually reoffended, fewer JAC youth (46 percent) reoffended within the first three
months than did non-JAC youth (77 percent). In one program, the researchers
compared the recidivism of youth according to whether they were assessed
fully. Matched on race, sex, age, and offense type, the findings suggested that
assessed youth were slightly less likely to recidivate than were nonassessed
youth (41 percent versus 45 percent). The authors noted, however, that the
findings should be interpreted with caution due to problems with data
sources and case matching (Wordes and Le 2000).
The NCCD study resulted in several key inferences about JAC programs and
their effectiveness:

>

Intensive community involvement and collaboration is critical to the success of
JAC programs, and achieving such collaboration sometimes requires the involvement of outside facilitators.

>

Key program design elements such as ensuring a single point of entry for delinquent youth and colocating services are difficult to integrate and may not be
feasible in all programs or in all instances.
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>

The use of structured client assessments and systematic case processing is important for implementing integrated case management approaches.

>

The use of an interagency management information system is a powerful incentive for integrating services, but developing real-time, cross-system information is
expensive and technically challenging, and it entails risks to client confidentiality.

It was clear to the NCCD researchers that access to integrated data is critical
for meeting program operational goals as well as ensuring sound evaluation
outcomes (Oldenettel and Wordes 2000; Wordes and Le 2000). The study also
confirmed that launching a JAC program presents many challenges. Partnering efforts are often complicated by turf issues; net widening is nearly always
a significant concern; it is difficult to reconcile the competing functions of services and public safety in one program location; and the availability of a JAC
program does not necessarily help to reduce minority overrepresentation.
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Researchers began this process evaluation by meeting with police officials,
JISC staff, and representatives from a dozen other Chicago organizations
to discuss the JISC and its effectiveness. The research team then toured the
facility and observed its operations, including the intake, screening, and case
management process. In addition, researchers reviewed a range of documents from the JISC and the client data systems used to monitor agency
decisions and service delivery. Based on the information collected during the
evaluation, the research team concluded that five areas were critical for the
future development and effectiveness of the program: 1) funding; 2) program
design and target population; 3) agency partnerships; 4) governance, management, and staffing; and 5) data and information sharing.

Funding

According to the research literature, funding is nearly always a challenge
for programs like the JISC. Few assessment centers have been supported
exclusively through federal grants awarded directly to the program (Cocozza
et al. 2005). As in Chicago, the programs are most frequently funded through
a combination of federal, state, and local funds (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et al.
2005; Clark 2007; Silverthorn 2003). In at least one instance, an assessment
center was able to fund its programs with resources from a Community
Service Block Grant (Cronin 1996). In another instance, the staff of a center
was funded through local parks and recreation budgets (Villarreal and Witten
2006). Other creative funding arrangements have included private grants and
in-kind donations of space and equipment from community-based agencies
(Cronin 1996). Since the early days of the assessment center concept,
foundation funding has been especially rare (Cronin 1996).
The Chicago Experience
The Chicago JISC experienced its share of difficulties due to funding issues. As
early as 1999, City officials saw an opportunity to launch a new screening and
referral program using money available through the Juvenile Accountability
Block Grant administered by the U.S. Department of Justice. The funding was
to be awarded to the state of Illinois and passed on to the city through the
interagency Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition and the Chicago Police
Department (CPD). The intricacies of the funding mechanism added to the
complications that would later emerge around the strategy and mission of
the program.
When the JISC was very close to opening, some officials were reportedly
surprised to learn that much of the federal funding awarded to the City had
already been spent to renovate the police building on South California Street,
and the program’s security arrangements were already finalized. According
to City officials, initial conflicts over program funding were due at least partly
to misunderstandings. Because of the complicated nature of interagency
efforts and the fact that one of the key players, the Department of Children
and Youth Services (CYS), was a relatively new City agency, finalizing the
operational plan for the JISC took longer than expected.
The partner agencies spent several years debating the structure and service
approach to be used by the new program. The Mayor’s Office became
concerned that the City could lose the federal funding if the approved (and
even extended) budget period for the program expired before the JISC itself
opened.
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To expedite the development of the JISC and to start the flow of federal
expenditures, the CPD was authorized to use much of the initial grant to
renovate the building in which the JISC was to be housed. Later, some critics
believed that CPD had spent so much of the federal grant on the building
that there was little money left for staffing and service delivery. These
decisions, made for practical reasons, had unfortunate consequences for the
stability of the JISC and the strength of the interorganizational collaboration
required to design and operate the program.
There were also numerous issues related to funding as the JISC began to
receive referrals. The Sinai Community Institute, the organization contracted
to provide case management services to JISC youth, experienced long
delays in receiving compensation due to CPD contracting requirements.
Misunderstandings continued to occur about who was in control of case
management. When the City’s Children and Youth Services agency was
officially included in JISC operations, it wanted to alter the case management
system in ways that CPD officials did not support or understand. This added
more complexity to the existing funding issues. Tensions over funding were
highest during the year leading up the opening of the JISC. By the second
year of program operation, most budget issues had been resolved through
the leadership and persistence of City officials, principally those at Chicago
Public Schools, the Department of Children and Youth Services, and the
Chicago Police Department.

Program Design and Target Population

In every previous evaluation of centralized assessment centers similar to the
JISC, researchers have discussed the importance of matching the program
design to the target population. Although programs like the JISC vary in how
they define their target populations, they generally take two forms (Cronin
1996). Slightly more than half the programs serve youth arrested for less
serious offenses and those not considered appropriate for secure detention.
Some programs even provide services to noncriminal youth, including those
referred for truancy. Just under half of all JAC programs serve a broader range
of youth, including some arrested for serious offenses but often excepting
cases involving violent offenses. The Chicago JISC handles a wide range of
youth, including some headed for court referral and detention, but its case
management component mainly targets youth charged with nonviolent
offenses (i.e., those involving no gun charges), youth with few prior offenses,
and youth whose current offense and prior record are not severe enough to
justify secure detention or court referral.
The design of JAC programs similar to the JISC is often based on the needs
of the target population, as identified by screening and assessment. The
program elements most frequently discussed in the evaluation literature
are youth screening and assessment; the case management process; the
program’s source of referrals; the degree to which participation in services
is mandatory; procedures for client follow-up; and the role of sanctions,
consent, and parent involvement. In the majority of programs previously
studied, initial screenings were conducted by police (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et
al. 2005). In some programs, however, case management or counseling staff
worked with their law enforcement partners to conduct screenings and to
assess each youth’s appropriateness for referral to the program (Cronin 1996;
Castrianno 2007).

24 |

The JISC
process involves
some obvious
contradictions.

In most programs, full assessments are conducted whenever a youth is
identified during the initial screening as being in need of a full assessment.
The comprehensiveness of these assessments and the tools used to conduct
them vary. In all programs, however, case managers or counseling staff, rather
than police officers, conduct the full client assessment. In some programs,
families are included, but in others, only the youth is present (Cronin 1996).
Some programs similar to the JISC are either unable or are not designed to
conduct full assessments. These programs generally serve a more limited
population (Villarreal and Witten 2006; 18th Judicial District Juvenile
Assessment Center 2007; Wordes and Le 2000).
Case managers provide referrals to outside services in almost all assessment
centers similar to the JISC, and nearly all such programs follow up with youth
to ascertain their actual level of participation. If an assessment center does
not involve outside service providers, it is usually because the program itself
is operated by a service provider. A smaller number of assessment centers do
not provide any referrals for services but instead conduct an initial screening
that merely determines whether youth should go to court or be diverted
(Castrianno 2007).
Nearly half of all programs similar to the JISC require youth to participate in
services when referred. Seven of 20 programs examined in previous studies
included some mechanism to ensure that noncompliant youth received
sanctions, including being referred back to the traditional juvenile justice
process for prosecution (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et al. 2005; Villarreal and
Witten 2006; Castrianno 2007). However, only four of the programs rigorously
tracked service participation by youth after they had been referred to outside
providers. Three of these four programs worked with youth who were
mandated to participate in services (Cocozza et al. 2005).
The Chicago Experience
The station-adjusted youth referred to Sinai Community Institute (SCI) case
management are the core clients of the JISC, in that the JISC represents an
alternative approach for dealing with young offenders in Chicago. When
the first executive director of the JISC started in 2006, approximately 5 to 8
percent of youth arrested by the CPD and delivered to the JISC were station
adjusted and referred for SCI services. That percentage soon rose to between
15 and 20 percent. There is no predetermined number of youth that can
be referred to case management, but the JISC philosophy suggests that,
whenever a youth can be feasibly and safely returned home and whenever
the case does not involve a serious or violent charge, then the youth is
appropriate for station adjustment and case management.
The JISC process involves some obvious contradictions. To put it very simply,
there are two options for working with troubled youth accused of relatively
minor offenses. One option is to connect the youth with case managers,
social workers, and community agencies in an effort to turn them around
and get them back on a path to healthy development and future citizenship.
The second option relies on the justice system to ensure accountability and
control youths’ behavior.
The justice system demonstrates to youth that police, prosecutors, and
judges have the power to inflict punishment and that illegal behavior results
in loss of liberty.
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Like other aspects of the juvenile justice system, however, the JISC seems
to embrace both choices without true fidelity to either. The JISC’s stated
mission is to use social services to prevent future criminal behavior and to
engage youth in community supports and opportunities that bind them
to conventional social structures. When youth come into the JISC, however,
they are immediately handcuffed, fingerprinted, and photographed before
spending up to several hours in what amounts to a holding cell. Youth receive
mixed signals. Of course, security issues are a real concern for staff at the JISC.
The case managers and social workers employed by SCI do not often see the
risks faced by CPD staff during the intake and screening process. For example,
one CPD official relayed the story of a 13-year-old boy brought to the JISC
and found to be in possession of a pair of brass knuckles equipped with a
hidden blade several inches long.
As a precautionary measure, therefore, every youth is treated initially as if he
or she might have a weapon. Every youth is patted down and searched. Many
are handcuffed to the bench in the intake area. CPD officers point out that,
without handcuffs, a distressed person could become panicked or enraged,
endangering anyone in the room. When people are placed in custody, their
mental state changes, and their reactions are unpredictable. According to one
CPD officer, “It is impossible to know everybody’s personality. This is why they
are secured to a bench during questioning. It is for their safety and for the
safety of others.”
What CPD officers do not acknowledge is the impact these security policies
have on the rest of the JISC process. A few hours after being handcuffed to a
bench, a youth who ends up receiving a station adjustment and a referral to
SCI will be asked to sit in a room just yards away from the secure holding area
and engage in an assessment with a case manager. The assessment requires
the parent and youth to participate in an open and frank discussion about
their issues with family, peers, and school. In a matter of hours and within the
same small building, the JISC process demands that youth go from a lock-up
environment to a therapeutic milieu, and they are expected to cooperate fully
with the staff in each setting.
Parents may be irate by the time the assessment occurs. When the
assessment begins, they may have been waiting in the JISC lobby for three
to four hours, at which point a case manager meets with them to obtain
consent to implement a Youth Assessment and Screen Instrument and other
individualized assessments. The goal of the assessment phase is to obtain as
much information as possible about each youth and family. If the parent asks
for the family assessment to be postponed until another time, the three most
important consent forms are completed, and a home visit or an appointment
at a neutral location is scheduled. The goals of the entire process are to
complete the appointment within 24 hours, to triage cases effectively, and to
implement the individual service plan as soon as possible.
The SCI service plan is a key component of the JISC. The initial service
plan meeting includes the parent or guardian in order to provide the case
manager with a full understanding of each youth’s situation, especially if the
juvenile is nonresponsive. If, during the initial assessment at the JISC, the
family indicates that more immediate intervention is necessary, SCI will work
to put supports in place right away.
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The goal of case management is to employ a wide range of strategies and
engage youth in a variety of services and supports that reduce the chances
of future criminal behavior and subsequent justice involvement. One of the
initial stated principles of the JISC was to build its efforts with youth around
the frameworks of restorative justice and positive youth development. The
youth development approach and strength-based approaches that cultivate
a youth’s existing strengths or talents, in particular, were very innovative ideas
for Chicago’s juvenile justice system.
SCI staff work to build on the strengths of each youth by asking a series
of questions about the youth’s daily activities and then determining what
services and supports might be appropriate. For example, a juvenile arrested
for “tagging” walls might be referred to an art program. A youth interested in
athletics may be connected with programs offered by the local park district.
In deciding on referrals, case managers are especially concerned to find
services and opportunities that are local and safe. The case manager makes
the initial contact with a program, ensuring that there is space available,
and then follows up to make certain the young person attends the initial
appointment and begins services. The case manager gives the program as
much information as possible about the youth. If transportation is an issue
and there is no alternative, the case manager may even transport a youth
to the various program sites involved in the service plan. If there is gang
involvement or if the youth lives in a known gang area, the SCI staff consider
areas in which the juvenile can safely travel.
When warranted, of course, SCI refers families to counseling. If the situation
calls for consistent and long-term treatment, families are referred to providers
outside of SCI. Choosing the best resources for every client remains an
individual decision. Case managers try to develop their own relationships
with outside providers; at the same time, they inform each other about the
resources they use.
Case managers try to find services that are accessible to the family. If there is
a relatively inexpensive option—for example, a YMCA membership—SCI will
often offer resources to cover the fee. Case managers look for services that
families will be able to maintain. Still, two years after the opening of the JISC,
few people involved with the program were entirely satisfied with the type
of community-based resources available. Case managers at SCI reported that
sometimes very few options were available for clients beyond the traditional
menu of school-based programs, family counseling, and anger management
programs.
The development of new resources for youth remained difficult in part
because the JISC was controversial among some youth professionals in
Chicago. Many people working in the youth advocacy community were
opposed to the idea of the JISC because published accounts of efforts to
implement similar centers in Florida were often quite negative, indicating
that the model had failed to meet expectations, partly due to the reduced
discretion of patrol officers responsible for making initial decisions regarding
individual youth. Some youth advocates involved in the evolution of the
JISC were concerned that the program would contribute to net widening.
These community members feared that the mere presence of the JISC as an
alternative to traditional police processing might increase the willingness of
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police, schools, and social services to involve young offenders in the justice
process. Ironically, these advocates could view the range of interventions
offered to JISC youth as a risk because a rich and diverse array of resources
could encourage police to make more arrests and to bring more youth
through the JISC process. These concerns may have been allayed somewhat
by the fact that the number of youth referred to the JISC actually declined
during its first two years of operation.
Even after the JISC had been open for more than a year, some staff at JISC
partner agencies believed the program was not identifying young offenders
early enough or providing sufficient interventions. According to one worker,
by the time youth were referred to the JISC, many of them had needed
intervention for some time. Some youth were arrested at school for troubling
incidents that took place weeks or months earlier. In other cases that
resulted in JISC referrals, students may have simply been at the wrong place
at the wrong time and could have become involved in an incident almost
accidentally. If case managers had been immediately on hand, some of these
youth might have been handled differently and might not have required
further justice processing.
The foundational concept behind the JISC was to take youth who would have
traditionally been station adjusted at individual station houses within various
police districts and bring them to one place where there could be a more
thoughtful evaluation that might distinguish between youth who needed
more formalized juvenile justice involvement and those who did not. The
JISC process is a drastic improvement over the old station-house process of
writing down the names of juveniles, talking with them about making better
choices, and then sending them home and hoping for the best. With the JISC,
youth and their families have access to case management services designed
to follow their progress more closely and to help youth stay out of trouble.
Unfortunately, the original description of the JISC left the issue of what
type of services should be included fairly ambiguous. The CPD worked
with a consultant to construct a specific JISC screening instrument that was
supposed to indicate what services would be appropriate, but there was little
clarity regarding the application of the screening and what would be done
when needed services were not available.
It was never easy to describe the JISC model because much of the actual
intervention depends on the decisions made by case managers and their
success in actually involving youth in various services, supports, and
opportunities. What exactly happens with JISC youth once they begin case
management? According to one worker at SCI, sometimes case management
involves referring youth for particular services, “but a lot of times we just
work with them, make sure they are going to school … and we work with the
family, we document that we went to the school and worked with the school
to get the youth back in, or we go with mom to sign papers at the school.”
Such a characterization of case management may be accurate, but it is also
one of the reasons that CPD staff continued to be skeptical of SCI well after
the center opened.
According to some CPD officials, case management appeared to be a
euphemism for inconsistent and ad hoc interventions provided in an
uncoordinated fashion and with little documentation of the program’s
activities or effects.
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Despite these criticisms, most of the Chicago practitioners and policy
makers interviewed for this study remained very supportive of the JISC in
theory. Several people involved in the program, including some CPD officers,
envisioned the JISC as a community-oriented and family-friendly place where
parents could simply walk in with their children if they were having trouble
supervising them or managing their behavior. In fact, by 2008 the JISC was
seeing about 200 families per year on a walk-in basis.
In an even more desirable situation, CPD officers could encourage clients
to seek help from the JISC voluntarily. The ideal scenario might involve an
officer who has some experience with a family and believes that a youth is
at risk of justice involvement. Rather than making an arrest, the officer could
encourage the youth and family to go to the JISC. Perhaps the officer could
even agree to meet them there and then facilitate the youth’s entrance into
the JISC process, but without making an arrest and without fingerprinting
and booking. The youth could still be connected with the resources made
available through the SCI case management process.
According to another CPD official, however, using the JISC as a walk-in center
for neighborhood families could have unintended consequences. Parents
who were unable to access other resources for their troubled youth could
end up reporting them to the police simply in an effort to get them under
control and back on track. It would be up to the JISC staff to warn parents that
involving their children in the justice system even informally entails risk.
Eventually, the JISC might be a place for parents and kids to get real help
with services. More than two years after it opened, however, few people
interviewed for this study were convinced that the JISC was able to offer
the full range of resources and supports once envisioned. Most observers
believed much work remained.
Finally, several people interviewed for this study worried about the strength
of the JISC approach if the CPD and the State’s Attorney’s Office were unable
to act in concert in cases of noncompliant youth. As mentioned earlier,
when a youth failed to follow through with the JISC service plan, the Cook
County State’s Attorney’s Office decided whether to prosecute the youth
on his or her original charges. JISC youth were most likely referred to SCI
case management in the first place, however, because their offenses were
not serious enough to warrant prosecution. Thus, the State’s Attorney could
be unlikely to file charges, even if the youth had failed to comply with case
management. Were this fact to become widely known in the community, of
course, it could undermine the strength and integrity of the JISC. Facing the
same circumstances, other youth programs, such as teen courts, sometimes
arrange for mandatory prosecution agreements in cases of noncooperating
youth so that parents and youth know that failure to participate will result in
court proceedings (Butts, Buck, and Coggeshall 2002).

Agency Partnerships

Agency partnerships have been a central concern in nearly all previous
studies of assessment centers similar to the JISC (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et
al. 2005; Harrison and Gisseman 2006 2007; Villarreal and Witten 2006; Clark
2007; Silverthorn 2003). Partnerships during the planning process frequently
involve key juvenile justice figures such as prosecutors, defense attorneys,
juvenile court judges, and court staff as well as law enforcement agencies.
At least half the programs previously described by researchers involved
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partnerships that included State and City government leaders, public health
officials, child and family social service agencies, mental health providers,
drug treatment agencies, and public schools. Approximately one-fourth of
the programs involved child protection agencies (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et
al. 2005; Harrison and Gisseman 2006, 2007), while legal aid organizations
and local community organizations such as the United Way, the Chamber of
Commerce, and community foundations were sometimes involved but less
frequently than the more mainstream youth-related agencies (Castrianno
2007).
The agency partnerships developed by juvenile assessment center programs
are almost always contentious. Partners disagree about policies and methods
of practice, guidelines for distributing clients and jobs, the extent (or lack)
of collaboration with surrounding communities, and the nature of their
respective roles and responsibilities (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et al. 2005;
Wordes and Le 2000). Some centers similar to the JISC have involved outside
mediators in their efforts to find acceptable solutions to complex problems
related to partnerships and collaboration. Other programs have found that
strong leadership, clear role expectations, and simply having more time for
interaction are helpful in addressing partnership tensions (Wordes and Le
2000).
The Chicago Experience
Forming effective partnerships was always a critical challenge for the
Chicago JISC. The center was designed as a multiagency partnership, but
there were many interorganizational issues that had to be resolved before
the process could operate smoothly. Major partners included the Chicago
Police Department, the Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services,
the Chicago Public Schools, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, and
the Cook County Department of Juvenile Probation. However, the degree
of involvement of the different partners varied. Some agencies were more
central in the design and development of the center than others. For
example, CPD staff prepared the federal grant proposal that made the JISC
possible. This allowed the CPD to take a leading (some would say controlling)
role in the development of the center.
The original proposal that funded the JISC named the Chicago Department
of Human Services as the lead service provider. Soon after, however, most
City programs for children and youth were combined to form a new agency,
the Department of Children and Youth Services (CYS). The new agency
accepted responsibility for the social services component at the JISC, and
the first executive director of the JISC was a CYS employee. By the time
the JISC opened its doors in 2006, the CPD and CYS were viewed as the
principal partners. Some critical problems, however, had still not been solved.
In particular, the uncomfortable presence of CPD’s security procedures
throughout the JISC process had not been addressed effectively, despite
repeated attempts by City officials to resolve the issue.
The JISC building inspired other concerns that affected the partnership. A
number of officials interviewed for this study noted the challenges involved
in placing the JISC in a police department building on Chicago’s South
California Street. One City staff member observed that, “Although we really
try not to call it a police station, the families recognize the building as a police
station, and as much as we try to explain that it’s not, it’s hard to break down
that image, or that label, in their minds … they talk about it that way.”
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The JISC Saves Enough Police
Work Time for Nearly 5 FullTime CPD Officers
2 ½ hours

Average time a CPD
officer is “off the
street” to process
a juvenile arrest in
areas of Chicago
without a JISC
program

45 minutes

Average time an
officer is “off the
street” to process a
juvenile arrest at the
JISC

1 hour, 45
minutes

Officer work time
saved for each
juvenile arrest
processed at the JISC
(i.e., 2 ½ hours minus
45 minutes)

5,600 arrests

Annual number
of juvenile arrests
processed at the
Chicago JISC (as of
2008)

9,800 hours

Estimated annual
number of CPD
officer work hours
saved by processing
juvenile arrests at the
Chicago JISC (i.e., 1
hour and 45 minutes
multiplied by 5,600)

2,016 hours

Annual work hours
of a CPD officer (i.e.,
168 hours per month
multiplied by 12)

4.9 officers

Estimated number
of full-time officer
positions potentially
created by the
availability of the JISC
per year (i.e., 9,800
hours divided by
2,016 hours)

Note: Figures for “off-street” time were derived
by asking working CPD officers to estimate
the time required to process juvenile arrests in
various police districts.

In order to succeed, the JISC needed to be a collaboration among
organizations. Many professionals involved in the program expressed a
fear that the central role played by the CPD could limit the effectiveness of
the JISC. Leaders of community organizations involved with the program
expressed respect for individual police officers, but they also acknowledged
that they did not have a positive relationship with the department as a
whole. It was partly due to these concerns that the designers of the JISC
wanted social services to play a strong role in the program. In particular, case
management at the center was to be a social services function and not a
police department operation.
Some observers believed that the Chicago Police Department saw the JISC
primarily as an opportunity to improve the efficiency of case processing.
Before the opening of the center, CPD officers took juvenile offenders to
any one of many different locations throughout the city for booking and
processing. This resulted in lengthy delays, as the arresting officer(s) had to
wait for designated juvenile officers to review and process each case before
they could return to patrol duties. Under the centralized system enabled
by the JISC, officers were able to bring youth to a single location, use a
computerized processing station to prepare their paperwork and file the
initial arrest report, and then turn the youth over to the JISC process and get
back onto the street more quickly. The presence of the JISC allowed for much
quicker turnaround and much less downtime for officers. In fact, CPD officers
making juvenile arrests were under a mandate to spend as little time as
possible at the JISC. One police official described CPD efforts to get arresting
officers back on the street quickly as a “top priority” of the department. In
2008, CPD officers estimated that it took 45 minutes for an arresting officer to
process a youth at the JISC and return to patrol duty. This was far quicker than
at traditional station houses, where an officer might be off the street for more
than two hours (see sidebar).
According to police officials, however, the department was always in support
of bringing greater consistency to screening and assessment decisions
made at the JISC. In fact, the CPD developed new juvenile screening
procedures specifically for the JISC. A centralized and closely coordinated
screening and referral process made sense to nearly everyone, at least in
the abstract. However, centralization also reduces discretion, and it may
add inconvenience for some decision makers. After the implementation of
the JISC process, some CPD officers missed the degree of latitude they once
enjoyed in deciding how to respond to individual youth. According to one
officer, as soon as the JISC opened, it was clear that CPD leadership and the
State’s Attorney’s Office were going to be far more involved than before in
determining individual case outcomes. Before the JISC, officers themselves
often decided whether a youth was to be referred to juvenile court, adjusted,
deferred, or diverted. The expansion of people and organizations involved in
case-related decision making was not always welcome.
In the view of other City leaders, the increased transparency and consistency
of case processing and case management for young offenders was exactly
the point of starting the JISC. When the JISC first opened, and before the
Department of Children and Youth Services had assumed its prominent role,
CPD staff had continued the screening and referral practices it had always
used for juvenile arrests. For many (even most) youth arrested for relatively
minor offenses, this meant a referral to one of the local service providers that
had long-term associations with the CPD. The choices available for minor
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offenders were extremely limited, and CPD officers were not encouraged to
look for resources outside the established comfort zone.
Soon after the JISC opened, the Chicago Department of Children and Youth
Services stopped the CPD case management process. Instead, the Sinai
Community Institute (SCI) was contracted to handle all case management
services for JISC-involved youth. Naturally, this meant that fewer youth would
be referred to other providers, including some with long-term relationships
with the CPD. This change created conflict between the key JISC partners.
Previously, the CPD had used a printed directory of local service providers to
identify available programs for arrested youth. When Sinai became involved,
the CPD forwarded this directory to them and suggested that SCI workers
might want to interview the existing agencies and continue to make use of
their services.
From the perspective of the Chicago Department of Children and Youth
Services, however, the essential mission of the JISC was to expand the pool of
resources beyond those already used by the CPD. In a true case management
system, the case manager (in this context, SCI) serves as a broker and recruiter
of service providers and is not simply a referral mechanism. JISC officials
described SCI’s responsibility as connecting every youth with whatever
services and supports were appropriate, whether or not such services were
already provided by an existing agency or even by SCI itself. In particular, the
JISC philosophy required more resources designed to engage and support
the strengths of youth rather than merely to identify and treat their deficits.
In the view of some CPD officials, the JISC philosophy sounded appealing, but
pursuing a drastic expansion of resources could result in less accountability.
They worried that SCI and its network of providers would not communicate
with the CPD about case outcomes. When asked about this criticism, the
managers of some nonprofit agencies in Chicago agreed with the CPD
assessment, but they viewed limited data sharing with the CPD as a virtue
rather than a defect. The mission of prevention services, they argued, is to
serve youth and families and to advocate their interests. One of the principal
goals of prevention programs is to keep youth from becoming more deeply
involved in the justice system. If an agency informed police officers about
each and every development in a youth’s case, they could jeopardize that
youth’s future success. In the view of service providers, it is necessary to
place an informational barrier between the social services sector and the law
enforcement sector.
The Chicago Police Department actually agreed with this view. Placing a
“firewall” between the CPD and case management was, in fact, a critically
important feature of the JISC process. Police officials did not want highly
detailed information about the youth referred for case management, but they
also didn’t want to operate completely in the dark. CPD officials asked that
the department receive some form of case outcome summary for each youth.
However, community members were fearful of how the CPD would use any
case-specific information it obtained.
The issues surrounding case management and information sharing are a
key to understanding the tensions that existed between the organizational
partners involved in the JISC. From the very beginning of the JISC, some
service providers were seen as closely allied with the CPD, while others were
seen as partners of the Sinai Community Institute and the Department of
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Children and Youth Services. Some CPD staff believed that their providers had
been moved aside and were beginning to suffer from reduced referrals, while
SCI was protecting its own network of service providers. Until a case-tracking
information system could begin to generate reliable data about the patterns
of youth referrals and case outcomes, these suspicions would continue to
fester, making interagency cooperation more difficult.
In the view of some local agencies, on the other hand, the effort to design
and launch the JISC may have been chaotic and sometimes contentious, but
even these conflicts had immediate benefits. According to one experienced
youth worker, the quality and extent of communication among the CPD, the
Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services, the Sinai Community
Institute, the Chicago Public Schools, and community-based programs
during the development process was very helpful. Inter-organizational
communication is essential in making collaborative centers like the JISC
successful. The traditionally negative atmosphere and lack of effective
communication among youth-serving systems in the city had often
prevented endeavors like the JISC in the past. Partner agencies would clash
about mission and strategy, some would then leave, and everyone would end
up with even less motivation for the next time collaboration was required.
Open communication was seen as a critical feature of the JISC development
process. According to this argument, the more open and transparent quality
of the debate was actually quite productive.
For example, the implementation of the JISC gave City officials a reason to
review other areas of policy and practice related to youth. Coordination
between the CPD and the City school system had not always been effective.
During one JISC development meeting, a CPD official described how his
agency received numerous calls from the Chicago Public Schools, often for
incidents that the CPD believed should be handled at the school, either
though school-based discipline or alternatives such as the peer jury program.
The CYS learned that the school disciplinary code did not provide principals
and teachers with enough discretion. School personnel could react either
by calling the police or by not reporting the incident—there was no middle
ground. As part of the JISC development process, CYS reached out to local
high schools and was able to begin a useful dialogue on the matter.
Local decision makers tried to incorporate the views of key groups as the JISC
designed its case management approach. Researchers, justice professionals,
and community members met to discuss strategies, with the objective of
building better interagency relationships and exploring best practices. Those
involved believed that effective case management was essential to the
success of the JISC. One person interviewed for this study even characterized
the case management function as the best way to avoid net widening.
Many people involved in the design of the JISC expressed the concern that
it could transform the purpose of station adjustments. If police began to
increase the numbers of youth they apprehended simply in order to refer
them for preventive services, this would widen the net of intervention. Seeing
that the newly centralized process was more efficient, CPD officers might
begin to bring youth into the system on lesser offenses for which, before,
they might simply have issued a warning, in part to avoid the delays and
paperwork associated with an arrest. Community representatives called
for increased accountability and transparency in police processing, arguing
that even station adjustments could become cumulative burdens for youth.
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If youth accrue numerous station adjustments, it would not matter if they
were just 13 years old and charged with minor offenses; they would be more
likely to go to court and more likely to be prosecuted. Thus, youth living in a
neighborhood served by the JISC may be more at risk of court involvement,
simply because a record of station adjustments at the JISC may propel them
into the justice system more quickly. For this reason, some youth services
professionals argue that arresting youth and taking them to the JISC may not
always be the best way to support youth and families, even though the JISC
was designed to do just that.

Governance, Management, and Staffing

Of the 20 previous program evaluations reviewed for this study, 14 included
a discussion of governance issues, 15 investigated the effects of program
staffing, and nearly half addressed the dynamics of the co-location of
services. A board of representatives from community-based and government
agencies governed the majority of the programs reviewed. Programs were
managed by community-based agencies specializing in mental health or
managed care (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et al. 2005; Clark 2007; Wordes and Le
2000). Approximately 20 percent were managed by City or County lead social
service agencies, and one was managed by the juvenile justice system (Cronin
1996; Harrison and Gisseman 2006; 18th Judicial District Juvenile Assessment
Center 2007; Castrianno 2007; Wordes and Le 2000; Silverthorn 2003).
The size of assessment centers similar to the JISC varied by community
and was often dependent on program design, target population, and the
size of the community itself. The programs were most frequently staffed
by a combination of community-based social service agencies and law
enforcement. Social service agencies provided intake, assessment, and case
management services. Law enforcement provided escorts, security, and
initial screenings (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et al. 2005; Villarreal and Witten 2006;
Castrianno 2007; Clark 2007; Silverthorn 2003).
Other staff might include school system staff, substance abuse workers, City
and/or County social services, juvenile justice personnel, and interns and/
or volunteers. Approximately 40 percent of programs were staffed by school
officials, including truancy specialists, academic information specialists, and/
or clinical service workers. Substance abuse workers were less common,
although they were present in approximately 30 percent of the juvenile
assessment centers studied previously (Cronin 1996; Cocozza et al. 2005;
Harrison and Gisseman 2006, 2007; 18th Judicial District Juvenile Assessment
Center 2007). City and/or County social services; juvenile justice personnel,
including the district attorney; and student interns were involved in some of
the assessment centers examined by researchers (Cronin 1996; 18th Judicial
District Juvenile Assessment Center 2007; Wordes and Le 2000).
Staffing issues are often complicated by the diverse institutional and work
cultures of the various agencies that cooperate to design and operate the
programs (Wordes and Le 2000). Tensions between law enforcement and
service providers were mentioned in some studies. Colocation of services was
noted in almost half of the programs studied previously. Several assessment
centers were colocated with diversion programs (Wordes and Le 2000;
Silverthorn 2003). In a few programs, assessment centers were attached to
substance abuse facilities (Wordes and Le 2000) or colocated with truancy
centers. (Cronin 1996).
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In some cases, researchers observed that the general public did not
understand the distinction between the staff of the juvenile assessment
center and the staff of the agency providing colocated services. However,
the blurring of these lines was not seen as problematic and was often seen
as evidence that collaboration and colocation were functioning well (Cronin
1996; Wordes and Le 2000).
The Chicago Experience
The JISC structure was complicated from the very beginning. The federal
grant that launched the center specifically authorized the City’s Juvenile
Crime Enforcement Coalition to exercise oversight, and its members quickly
assumed a supervisory role over JISC operations. Yet, there was a separate
oversight board as well as a board of directors for the JISC. The executive
director appeared to be answerable to all three bodies, creating redundancy
and confusion. There were also several organizational charts during the early
phases of JISC operations. One chart portrayed the JISC using CPD’s mission,
goals, and objectives; another used the CYS mission and goals; a third relied
on the goals and objectives of the Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition. The
charts were not integrated, but all were circulating at the same time, causing
considerable confusion.
The JISC executive director was placed in the unenviable position of trying to
stitch together two completely different units of City government (CPD and
CYS) that had two completely different missions and cultures. Compounding
these difficulties was the fact that the JISC had become operational before
the two units had an opportunity to come together to form a shared vision
for it. The CPD opened the police and intake components before CYS had the
service provision component in place. In addition, both departments were
authorized to commit JISC funds and resources, but they were not organized
to do this in a collaborative manner. The lack of coordination led to difficult
interactions between CPD and CYS, and between the JISC director and other
JISC staff.
The location of the Chicago JISC also presented many challenges. During
the earliest discussions, the plan was to locate the facility in a north side
neighborhood, but many of those involved strongly opposed that location.
Local residents, in particular, did not want a program for juvenile offenders
in their community. Rather than fight the community, City officials chose a
South Side neighborhood. That site, however, introduced other complexities,
as mentioned earlier. The central problem was that the building chosen was
an existing police station in need of renovation. By the time the JISC actually
opened, the CPD was seen as the owner of the program, and it was unclear
how the social services and case management function would be integrated.
One key person interviewed for this study believed that the CPD always
intended to continue using its own network of service providers and that its
search for new providers was not entirely genuine.
After the JISC opened, the presence of nonpolice personnel inside a police
building was a continual source of misunderstanding. Tensions sometimes
boiled over in incidents that appear trivial in retrospect. For example,
during the first year of operation, several framed portraits of CPD leaders
were suddenly removed from the front hallway. Many officers assumed that
the JISC executive director (an employee of CYS rather than of CPD) had
requested their removal. After a period of morale-damaging rumors, it was
discovered that the order to remove the portraits had come from the CPD
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itself, which was awaiting the arrival of new replacements, but the officers
working at the JISC had not been informed.
Another issue concerned the labeling of the parking space reserved for
the JISC executive director. Some CPD officers placed great value on the
proximity and visibility of their parking spaces. Parking was ordinarily
reserved for top officials, and their titles were sometimes displayed on their
respective spots. The executive director of the JISC was to receive a parking
place near the front door, but labeling the sign with the words “executive
director” became problematic, as it suggested that a non-CPD person was
in charge of a CPD facility. Resolving the dispute consumed an inordinate
amount of time and energy.
Other conflicts focused on the efforts made for the center’s clients. Some
CPD officials worried that the range of services available through CYS and its
contractor, SCI, was not sufficient for the youth involved with the JISC, but the
police often felt excluded from conversations and planning related to youth
interventions. If the available services were not comprehensive and flexible
enough to meet the individual needs of youth, then the JISC model could
ultimately fail, and the CPD worried that it would be blamed for the failure.
Other challenges related to the flow of information between CPD staff and
other staff at the JISC. Although CPD officers and the JISC executive director
worked in the same location and on the same general tasks, the executive
director, as a civilian, had limited ability to disseminate information directly
to CPD officers. Even distributing a newsletter or memorandum about
JISC operations was considered a violation of CPD protocol—disregarding
the chain of command—if it was done by a civilian. Only the onsite CPD
lieutenant was authorized to provide such material to CPD officers.
Some problems stemmed from confusion over the sponsorship of the
center. When the JISC first opened, it was easy to see why members of the
community might have viewed it as just another police program. First, it was
located in a former station house with the words “Police Station” carved in
stone over the entrance. Next, upon entering the building, visitors walked
down a hallway decorated with those framed portraits of uniformed police
commanders. The JISC staff who first greeted visitors were also uniformed
CPD personnel. The civilian personnel were located upstairs or in offices not
otherwise accessible to visitors. The entire operation was focused on physical
security and control and was staffed by uniformed police. Why would visitors
think the JISC was anything other than a police station?
The City administration approved the presence of civilians at the JISC, but
CPD argued that for security reasons, uniformed officers should be visible at
all times at the front desk. One CPD leader pointed out that the sign in front
of the building still described it as a police station and police services needed
to be accessible. All parties agreed that having multiple agencies in the same
building was desirable, but CPD stressed that it was important for the police
presence to be paramount.
Most of these issues were raised during early discussion about the design
of the JISC, but when the building opened, the problems had not been
addressed effectively. One participant who was involved very early in the
development of the JISC noted that, even in 2008, there was still “ambiguity
about who is in charge. Is it the executive director, or is it CPD? There is still
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tension there. Who makes decisions about the program?” According to
this observer, any effort to resolve such tensions would have to involve the
mayor’s office. “Sometimes an external party has to step in and nudge [the
players] back into place.” The strong leadership of the JISC executive director
and the visible commitment to the JISC by key stakeholders at CPD and CYS
eventually led to improved relations between the two organizations. Once
there was more of a shared understanding of the JISC, some of the more
contentious issues could be addressed.
Some of challenges faced by the JISC have been related to the various
levels of government involved in juvenile justice policy in Chicago. One city
official admitted that the JISC was affected by a long-standing “City/County
problem.” In other words,
Why isn’t the City talking with the County as they work to figure
out the detention center issue? How can we support them in
building a network [of services]? Why aren’t we talking with Cook
	County and the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice to figure out
how to pilot something in the City of Chicago for kids who come
back from a DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice] facility? Why can’t
we talk with the County about how to support the needs of kids in
detention or the kids who have been released when their cases are
still open and they need supportive services?
The involvement of private agencies further complicated matters. The Sinai
Community Institute is a 501(c)(3) and part of the Sinai Health Systems.
When SCI was first approached to work with the JISC, it had been providing
management services in the Chicago area for more than 20 years. In 2006,
the SCI staff was asked to serve only as technical advisors for the JISC. The
City planned to hire case managers, and SCI was asked to conduct case
management training. The training took place over three months, after which
SCI received a request to hire the staff for actual case management work at
the JISC. Eventually, SCI became deeply involved in the design and operation
of the JISC case management process. Yet many important decisions about
program design and staffing had already been made. It was difficult for the
SCI staff to know which features of the JISC were already established and
which features were open to modification.
The line staff at SCI originally consisted of social workers, case managers,
and youth advocates. The social workers were primarily supervisors, but
they provided services as well, often by conducting individual counseling
and anger management groups. The case managers conducted youth and
family assessments and oversaw the development of service plans. The
youth advocates worked directly with youth and families to make sure the
service plans were implemented properly. Case managers performed the
initial assessments (the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument and SCI
assessments) at the JISC, often on the youth’s first day of contact with the
center. Once all assessments were completed, an SCI youth advocate would
begin to work with each youth and family. The advocates conducted home
visits and implemented the Individual Family Service Plan. Youth advocates
often worked with 30 or more cases each, but the initial goal was for each
advocate to have responsibility for no more than 20 to 25 cases.
During the early phase of JISC operations, there were often conflicts between
the case managers and the youth advocates. Some of the conflicts were
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inevitable. Youth advocates earned lower salaries, yet they performed many
of the same tasks as the case managers. Tensions grew as the JISC caseload
began to increase. The youth advocates believed that case managers spent
a lot of their time in the office, just “waiting for referrals,” while the advocates
were feeling overwhelmed with ever-growing caseloads and duties that took
them into some of Chicago’s most disadvantaged homes and neighborhoods.
The conflicts were soon resolved by eliminating the distinction between case
managers and youth advocates. Instead, all direct line SCI staff at the JISC
were designated as case managers.
Several city officials involved in setting up the JISC acknowledged in
interviews that many of the initial challenges were organizational and
structural. Despite serious conflicts during the early phases of designing
the center, however, one leader in City government observed that, at some
point, most of the people involved realized that it was time to “let go of
the past” and instead to focus on creating a useful organizational structure
for a program that would eventually come to exist. By the second year of
operation, the JISC had much more defined roles for all the agencies involved
in its operations and a much clearer understanding of the proper roles of the
board, the advisory board, the JISC executive director, the leadership of CYS,
and various officers and leaders of the CPD.

Data and Information Sharing

The emergence of juvenile assessment centers occurred during a time of
rapid technological innovation. During the 1990s and 2000s, social agencies
of all types were becoming accustomed to the use of integrated information
systems. Law enforcement systems, juvenile justice systems, and, indeed, all
human services enterprises operate more efficiently and effectively when
client data are integrated across agencies and when client outcomes can
be monitored at the individual, programmatic, and jurisdictional levels. Yet
access to such data inevitably raises concerns about data management and
the uses to which such data could be put beyond program operation. In some
communities where officials have tried to implement assessment centers
similar to the JISC, worries about information sharing and data privacy were
severe enough that key agencies ended up withdrawing from the programs
(Cronin 1996). The data issues raised in previous studies may be different from
the ones faced by programs today, but many of the core considerations, such
as the construction of integrated databases and procedures for information
sharing, remain relevant.
Youth-serving agencies are always concerned about the legal issues related
to information sharing and client privacy, including the issue of net widening,
but access to reliable and actionable information is critical for system impact.
Many programs ask clients to sign consent forms acknowledging their
participation in the assessment process and their awareness of the program’s
tracking of information, in order to ensure that clients understand their
rights to privacy but that data about their service participation may be used
in future court proceedings (Cronin 1996) Most juvenile assessment center
programs require parents to sign such consent forms, and some require youth
to sign as well (Clark 2007; Cronin 1996). Even when signatures are required,
however, previous studies have noted that program staff are sometimes
concerned that youth and parents do not fully understand the implications
of consent. Assessment centers like the JISC have sometimes formed
interdisciplinary teams to monitor problems arising from the collection and
use of client information.
38 |

From a law enforcement
perspective, it was
essential to track the
involvement of each
youth in JISC-related
services and to apprise
the State’s Attorney ’s

Office of any case in

which a youth refused
to comply with JISC
requirements.

The Chicago Experience
According to city officials, the Chicago JISC handled approximately 3,000
youth in its first six months of operation. Initially, there were no systematic
efforts to track the participation of these youth in the case management
and services provided by the JISC. Within a year, however, the creation and
distribution of data about JISC clients had become a major concern for all
the organizational partners. As was true with other elements of the JISC
process, the partners from law enforcement and social services often found
themselves on opposite sides of the debate.
From a law enforcement perspective, it was essential to track the involvement
of each youth in JISC-related services and to apprise the State’s Attorney’s
Office of any case in which a youth refused to comply with JISC requirements.
Not only did the police department wish to hold youth accountable for their
agreements to participate in the program, but CPD officials believed it was
important to track participation and outcomes in order to respond effectively
in cases in which a youth is rearrested following a referral to the JISC. Officers
reviewing the new charge would need to know that the youth had been
diverted previously, and their decision to divert a second charge could
depend on the youth’s level of cooperation after the first charge. In addition,
the CPD wanted to know exactly what mix of services, opportunities, and
supports had been offered to a youth, not only to plan future interventions
for that particular youth but to assess the overall effectiveness of the services
and programs available.
From a social services perspective, however, diversion means diversion. If
the JISC process was constructed to give youth another chance and to spare
them the stigma of involvement with the justice system, then as soon as the
youth and parent sign the consent form and begin to work with SCI case
management, they are social services clients and not juvenile offenders
whose movements must be monitored by the police. If the youth and families
involved in case management knew that their behavior was being reported
back to the police and that their cooperativeness would affect future
decisions made by CPD and the State’s Attorney’s Office, they would be far
less likely to trust the SCI staff. It would also be harder for them to see the
services and supports offered by the case managers in a positive light.
These basic differences in perspective complicated efforts to create useful
information about JISC operations and client outcomes. After two years of
operation, people working with the JISC on a daily basis were still not entirely
clear about just what type of data could be shared with others outside their
own agencies. All the partner agencies agreed that some client processing
information should be readily accessible so that problems and issues could
be identified quickly and addressed effectively. Yet, according to one staff
member of a JISC-related agency in early 2008, sometimes it was still not clear
“what information can go where, and who can have access to what.”
In interviews conducted for this study, several City officials emphasized that
the police did not need to see comprehensive individualized information
about the progress of each JISC-involved youth, but they did need to know
whether a minor complied with services or not, and they did need to know
whether the youth and family were sincerely engaged or if they simply
“went through the motions.” The police also wanted basic information about
youth within 90 days of referral to SCI. Whenever there was a possibility that
the State’s Attorney’s Office might want to file charges in a case following
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noncompliance with the JISC process, that filing had to happen quickly.
Further, having some details about a youth’s progress could impact future
processing for youth picking up new charges. For youth arrested on new
charges, the police should be able to determine how the youth responded to
any prior diversion opportunities. Did the youth actively participate? Would it
be foolish to try diversion again?
Even when the partner agencies could agree on a basic approach to
information, simple counting problems complicated the issue. CPD and SCI
approached the same data differently. CPD counted each incident separately.
If a youth was arrested and taken to the JISC on four separate occasions, CPD
counted that as four referrals. On the other hand, SCI counted youth and not
criminal incidents. Given the same scenario, SCI may note the four arrests,
but their workers would consider the youth as one referral. Because CPD
maintained all juvenile records citywide, the official performance measures
for the JISC used the CPD counts, but the workload measures for the JISC
often used the SCI count.
Of course, there were numerous coordination problems, from concerns over
who got access to what information and when, to basic decisions about
youth identifiers, measuring family involvement, sibling data, and so forth.
There were many issues with data collection as well. During the early phases
of the JISC, SCI relied on paper reports for much of its data collection. The
police department was far more automated and accustomed to having
greater data resources. CPD collected weekly data, whereas most agencies
collected and reported monthly numbers.
Due to the efforts of CPD and CYS, the JISC made considerable progress
in the development of management information systems during 2008.
As part of the development of the JISC, the City began working on an
integrated data system, known as CitySpan, which was to be implemented
across many City agencies. CPD agreed to enter basic data about each JISC
referral into CitySpan; SCI would then enter data about its case management
and service delivery efforts in the same system; and from this combined
database, City officials would be able to run comprehensive reports about
the characteristics of each case, the youth’s participation in services, and
relevant case outcomes. Questions remained, of course, about whether the
information in CitySpan was adequate and whether it captured the items
that would be needed for future evaluation work. The JISC partner agencies
continued to have discussions about the design and operation of information
systems well into 2008.
Even with an integrated information system, there were data elements that
CPD would not allow SCI to see, and there were data elements under the
control of SCI that CPD could not access. The goal of the CitySpan system
was to bring together information from the law enforcement and the social
services sectors without allowing either side to have complete access to all
information maintained by the other. For example, SCI was willing to share
summary information about cases but not highly detailed information. CPD
officers could know whether a youth was progressing satisfactorily through
the JISC process, but they might not know exactly which services a youth
received. Similarly, CPD tracked several core data elements for each youth
referred to the JISC, but only some of those elements were to be shared
with outside agencies. City officials believed that an increase in the extent of
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information exchanged would result in more positive outcomes for youth.
If CPD were able to use a shared data system to ascertain that a youth was
already involved with a certain agency, officers might use their discretion to
continue that service and decline to refer the youth to court immediately.
The SCI staff also worked to improve the reliability of the agency’s
information. Key events about every case involving a JISC-referred youth
were tracked using spreadsheets that the SCI executive director maintained.
Reports based on this information could be generated routinely to assess
whether the agency’s goals were being met and to monitor the status of
each case. At case closure, the SCI spreadsheet would indicate why the case
was closed (e.g., noncompliance, refusal of service, lack of participation,
hospitalization, relocation out of service area, or detention). This summary
information could then be entered into the CitySpan database.
Although it is difficult to assess data systems from a distance (this study did
not have direct access to any data from agency information systems for this
project), the data systems used to support JISC operations appear to be
growing stronger. Through the concerted efforts of the key partner agencies,
disputes about the proper role of data and information appear to have been
largely resolved, and the JISC program may have an adequate base of client
information with which to begin a formal evaluation of client outcomes.
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conclusion |
To many of those involved in Chicago’s youth policy environment, bringing
social services into a close partnership with law enforcement is quite
innovative. While there is usually broad support for prevention programs
that serve all youth (e.g., Chicago’s “After School Matters”), there is often less
support for programs serving young offenders. One long-time participant
in city affairs expressed deep concern about the decision-making climate in
Chicago.
Unfortunately, when we talk about youth, we tend to focus on
[primary] prevention programs and having cops in school so kids
can see the police. We never talk about the kids who [have already
been arrested]; people don’t like to talk about that population.
	Sometimes I see that the opportunity is there, but I don’t know
if people fully comprehend the opportunity. I hate to say this,
but I don’t think the [City] administration thinks about 		
kids who are already involved in the juvenile justice system. We, the
	City, tend to think about kids only in one way—kids who need afterschool or summer activities. That’s the only way we think about this
… We like to splash around in the shallow end of the pool, but we
don’t like to play in the deep end.
The JISC is decidedly not a police program, but the police were very involved.
Some officials from the Chicago Police Department viewed the JISC as a bold
departure, but others saw it as an extension of already familiar methods. One
police official pointed out that CPD was always engaged in some level of
social service and that it had long partnered with people in the community.
Yet, the same official admitted that there is often an “us/them thing” going
on in the police department’s interaction with communities. Such attitudes
often complicated efforts to coordinate the procedures of law enforcement
with the tasks and goals of social services. Another city official asserted
that, in developing the JISC, the goal was to respect all parties for their
unique contribution. “Leave law enforcement decisions to law enforcement
and social service decisions to social service providers. Let’s respect the
judgments of the professionals involved on both the law enforcement side
and the social service side. We are here to work together.”
Based on this review of JISC operations and interviews with the staff and
leaders of various offices and organizations involved with the JISC, the
research team reached a number of conclusions and recommendations about
the future of the JISC and the feasibility of conducting a formal outcome
evaluation of the program. These conclusions and recommendations
included the following:

Program Design, Governance, and Staffing

> The JISC program was developed in a complex environment. Key organizational

partners often held different views about the program’s mission, structure, and
funding. By 2008, however, there was a clear consensus about the purposes of the
JISC and the principal strategies for accomplishing its mission.

> Among the managers and workers involved in the JISC, concerns remained about
the organizational configuration of the program, its potential for unintended
consequences, the insufficient array of community-based resources available
for youth and families, and the policies governing data sharing. These concerns
needed to be identified and addressed by City leaders.
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> The most serious challenge to the future success of the JISC was the mixed

message it sent to the community. The JISC was designed as a provider of
diversion services for young and often first-time offenders. Yet the JISC process
for youth began inside a police station, where officers are responsible for a wider
range of offenders, including many youth headed to juvenile court. The security
environment necessary to handle potentially serious offenders permeated
the building and affected the demeanor of the staff, thus preventing the full
development of an effective diversion-oriented culture.

> To provide effective diversion for youth who are station adjusted and referred to

case management, the City must find some way to separate them earlier from
the more security-oriented features of the JISC process. The physical environment
and social space experienced by youth at the JISC should be a central part of the
program and should reflect and reinforce its guiding philosophy—namely, the
concepts of restorative justice and positive youth development.

> To ensure that the JISC process provided services, supports, and opportunities for

youth that were consistent with its guiding philosophy, all staff associated with the
JISC (whether from CPD, Children and Youth Services (CYS), the Sinai Community
Institute (SCI), or any other agency) should be fully, and continuously, trained in
positive youth development and restorative justice.

Resource Issues

>

City officials should reexamine their initial plans for the JISC and restore the
program to its original goals and purposes—i.e., to provide a broad range of
services, opportunities, and supports for youth and their families using the guiding
frameworks of restorative justice and positive youth development.

>

The agencies involved in the JISC partnership worked hard to develop resources
for youth, but the range of these resources still fell short of expectations.

>

The services and resources available to youth were not as comprehensive and
diverse as needed to fulfill the original vision for the program—namely, to
approach young offenders and their families from a restorative justice and positive
youth development perspective.

>

Too much responsibility for intervention rested with the SCI case management
staff. The initial vision was that case managers would perform screening, referral,
and monitoring functions, while interventions and opportunities for youth would
be implemented by a network of service providers and community organizations,
both voluntary and contractual. After two years, that network remained
inadequate.

>

Resources for JISC youth were constrained by funding shortages but also by the
limited vision of City leaders, agency officials, and program staff that often looked
no further than professionalized, reimbursable interventions in their search for
solutions to the city’s youth crime problem.

>

To build an effective network of services, supports, and opportunities for youth in
the communities served by the JISC, the City needed to engage in the protracted
community organizing necessary to develop the type of volunteer-based
neighborhood supports suggested by the foundational concepts that led to the
JISC.
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Data and Information Systems

>

The data systems used to support JISC operations appeared to be growing
stronger. Information systems maintained by the Chicago Police Department, the
Department of Children and Youth Services, and the Sinai Community Institute
appeared to be sufficient for conducting an outcome evaluation of the JISC.

>

Before it would be appropriate to evaluate client outcomes, however, the linkages
between the data systems of CPD, CYS, and the Sinai Community Institute needed
to be fully established and tested in an actual, operational context, and the range
of variables contained in those systems had to be assessed by independent,
external researchers to determine whether the available information was sufficient
for a high-quality outcome evaluation.

Agency Partnerships

> Despite long-standing divisions, most of the interagency issues surrounding the

JISC were resolved successfully during its first year of operation, due to the strong
leadership of the JISC executive director and the persistence of several key officials
in the Chicago Department of Children and Youth Services, the Chicago Police
Department, and the Mayor’s Office.

> The conflicts and differences between the partnering agencies were inevitable due
to the mission of the JISC and the position it occupied between the sectors of law
enforcement and social services.

> Agencies from law enforcement and those from social services always see their

task environments differently. The organizational culture of a police department
favors command and control, efficient case processing, individual-level data, and a
hierarchical approach to decision making. Social service agencies operate in a lesscontrolled, more turbulent environment in which staff are inadequately trained
and poorly compensated and often see part of their job as protecting clients from
a justice system whose motivations they do not completely share or trust.

> The continued success of the JISC depended on effective management of the

inherent incompatibilities between law enforcement and social services. These
differences may never be eliminated, but they must be acknowledged and
managed.

Recommendations to Facilitate Formal EvaluatioN

>

The JISC process must be improved in a number of ways before it would be wise
for the City of Chicago to evaluate its client outcomes in an outcome or impact
evaluation.

>

The services, supports, and opportunities provided for each JISC youth should
be determined by fully developed and truly individualized intervention plans,
and not be allowed to deteriorate into a one-size-fits-all approach in order to
accommodate the resource limitations of existing providers.

>

The range of interventions and supports available for JISC youth must be
consistent with the restorative justice and youth development frameworks that
were the original inspiration for the JISC program model. The resources offered
initially through the JISC process were not diverse enough to support the mission.

>

The JISC must be able to document the exact mix of services, supports, and
opportunities delivered to program youth during whatever period of time the
youth successfully participate in JISC-related activities.
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>

The record of service delivery activities and program participation by individual
youth must be stored in a database that draws upon a wide range of key data
elements available from CPD, CYS, and SCI.

> Some combination of individual-level outcomes (arrests, court referrals,

prosecutions, placements, school attendance, and so forth) must be available in
a consistent fashion for all former JISC youth through at least the first 12 months
following case closure, regardless of whether the case was terminated successfully
or unsuccessfully.

> Arrangements must be in place to track the same combination of individual-level

outcomes (or at least a key subset of those outcomes) among a comparison group
of youth who are similar to those involved in the JISC. It must be possible to track
the outcomes for comparison-group youth for up to 12 months following some
type of event that is arguably similar to case closure for JISC youth.

The Juvenile Intervention and Support Center may have changed the way
Chicago responds to young offenders who commit nonviolent crimes.
Through its efforts to develop and operate the JISC, the City inspired a new,
broadly shared philosophy: namely, that the most effective response to
young offenders does not always require referral to court, prosecution, and
incarceration. Instead, young offenders can be attached to resources that
engage them in pro-social activities, positive relationships, and structured
experiences that prevent future crime and lower their chances of becoming
more deeply involved in the justice system. After the JISC program opened
in 2006, a large number of individuals and agencies in the City of Chicago
worked hard to solidify the new collaborative relationships that made the
JISC possible. That work continued even after the first two years of operation.
Yet, the program appeared to be establishing itself as an innovative diversion
process for young offenders.
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